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Abstract
If bidders are uncertain about their value when they participate in an auction, they may
overbid and su¤er ex-post losses. Limited liability mitigates these losses, and may result
in more aggressive bidding and higher seller revenue, but also in an ine¢ cient allocation.
Using a combination of theory and experiment, we analyze three di¤erent forms of liability
in second-price auctions: full liability, limited liability by default with varying penalties,
and resale-based limited liability. With a default penalty, bids are higher than under full
liability, but nal revenue and e¢ ciency are lower due to the frequency of default. Auctions
with resale result in the highest revenue and allocative e¢ ciency, and are as e¤ective as a
low default penalty in alleviating bidderslosses. Hence, allowing resale as a form of limited
liability may be preferred by both bidders and sellers over other liability rules.
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1. Introduction
It is common in many auctions that bidders are uncertain of their valuations for the item on sale
when placing their bids. Examples range from auctions for second-hand items on eBay, auto
salvage, foreclosure and commodities such as cotton or timber, where the quality of the item is
uncertain, to large-scale spectrum auctions with uncertain future demand.1 When the value of
an item cannot be easily veried prior to placing a bid, or when the exact value is realized only
after the auction is concluded, bidders must choose their bids carefully. Even with meticulous
planning, however, bidders may su¤er losses if they overbid relative to their realized nal value
(e.g., Pagnozzi, 2007b).
Given the potential for overbidding and possible losses, liability rules stipulated by auction
designers prior to the auction taking place have a signicant e¤ect on biddersbehavior and
the nal allocation. In his practical guide for auction design, Klemperer (2002) highlights the
importance of properly structured default penalties: If default costs are small, then bidders are
bidding for options on prizes rather than the prizes themselves(p.176).
In fact, the failure to properly design clear auction payment and default rules can have
dramatic e¤ects. For example, McMillan (1994) reports of an Australian auction for satellite
television services where there was no penalty for default and the rules specied that the licenses
were awarded to the next highest bid in the case of default. The unexpected dark horse winners
gamed the auction by placing high winning bids that they had no intention of fullling, as well as
other lower bids. After a series of defaults, the licenses were awarded for an amount substantially
below the original highest bids, and one of the winners then resold for a prot. According to
McMillan (1994), The aw in the auction rules, the source of the cascading bids, was the
absence of a penalty for default, which meant bids were not meaningful(p. 149).
However, how an auction designer should optimally set default penalties, or whether he
should even allow default, is a nontrivial decision as di¤erent rules will have di¤ering e¤ects on
bidding behavior and auction outcomes. In the eld, a variety of di¤erent default and liability
rules are observed, some of which appear to have been introduced in an ad hoc manner.
At one end of the liability spectrum, in some auctions bidders are allowed to default with no
penalty, through bid retraction or even non-payment. For example, in the online marketplace
eBay winning bidders can ask for a full bid retraction.2 At the other end of the liability spectrum,
bidders are fully liable for any bid placed. While the bulk of auction research assumes full
liability, enforcing full liability in practice is di¢ cult, since it requires mechanisms to ensure full
payment by winners, such as a refundable deposit equal to the maximum possible bid. With
uncertain valuations, full liability leads to more conservative bidding because winning bidders
have no outside option in the event of a loss. Full liability, however, may increase e¢ ciency by
limiting default.
1A similar uncertainty also arises when bidders purchase to resell in a secondary market.
2Winning bidders can also just refuse to pay. While this behavior is recorded by eBay which could result in
future restrictions, no specic monetary penalty is imposed.
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Between the extremes of costless default and full liability, there are many common environ-
ments where default is allowed with a monetary penalty. For example, defaulting bidders in
the FCC C-Block Auctions paid a penalty equal to the di¤erence between the amount bid and
the amount of the winning bid the next time the license is o¤ered by the Commission plus an
additional penalty equal to 3 percent of the subsequent winning bid.3 In many other auctions,
bidders make an initial deposit equal to a percentage of the maximum bid, which is forfeited
in the event of default. For example, to participate in timber auctions in the U.S. state of
Washington, bidders pay a deposit of 10%, which is increased to 25% for previous defaulters.4
Since these penalties require a payment which is lower than the full amount owed, they might
help winning bidders mitigate realized losses. Hence, the option of default may allow bidders to
bid more aggressively, which raises (nominal) revenue but also increases the probability of an
ine¢ cient default. Clearly, the choice of a default penalty should balance the trade-o¤ between
revenue and the probability of default, which depends on the behavioral response by bidders.
All statutory limited liability elements are typically explicitly specied in the auction rules.
In addition, a di¤erent and less obvious form of (non-statutory) limited liability for bidders
arises through the opportunity to resell an item acquired in an auction, before having to pay
the auction price. Resale is a common occurrence in a variety of auctions where bidders face
uncertainty about their private valuations.5 In fact, once uncertainty over valuations is resolved,
a winning bidder who realizes he paid more than his actual value is willing to resell to a new
buyer with a higher value, thus limiting his losses or even making a total prot.
Therefore, allowing resale provides an outside option to auction winners who overpaid and
create a form of limited liability.6 Essentially, while with default limited liability arises through
the possibility of returning the item to the initial seller, with resale it arises through the pos-
sibility of exchanging it with another bidder. It follows that allowing resale may induce more
aggressive bidding, thus increasing revenue without the threat of default. And it can also lead
to e¢ ciency gains since items are resold to higher-valued buyers.
Although bidderstheoretical response to outside options should result in more aggressive
bidding with limited liability, their actual behavior across di¤erent liability rules may depend
on a number of behavioral reasons. For example, bidders may di¤er in their risk tolerance or,
with resale-based limited liability, they may be less sophisticated than theoretically assumed
and therefore unable to integrate a resale opportunity into their strategies. Thus, it is unclear
how actual bidders react to di¤erent limited liability environments, including those with more
3Source: C.H. PCS, Inc., BTA No. B347 Frequency Block C Order.
Retrieved: January 21, 2016 from http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/10/releases/da961825.pdf
4Source: Public Auction Sale of Timber, Book 965. July 2016.
Retrieved: February 27, 2018 from http://www.dnr.wa.gov/publications/psl_ts_jul16_auctionbook.pdf
5See e.g. Haile (2001) for an analysis of resale after timber auctions, and Haile (2003) for a general analysis of
private value uncertainty and resale.
6While in reality restricting post-auction resale may be di¢ cult, there are various auctions where resale is not
allowed. For example, resale was explicitly forbidden in the early U.S. spectrum auctions conducted by the FCC,
and in European countries. More recently, the FCC has relaxed restrictions on resale, but may impose penalties
for transactions taking place less than 5 years after the auction (see 47 C.F.R. section 1.2111 of the FCC).
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nuanced incentives such as resale or high default penalties.7
In order to address these issues, we analyze how bidding behavior and auction outcomes
change across di¤erent liability environments, using a combination of theory and economic ex-
periments. We consider a second price auction with two risk neutral bidders who observe a
private signal of their value, which then becomes known at the conclusion of the auction. Three
di¤erent settings are compared: full liability, limited liability induced through default with a
penalty payment, and resale-based limited liability. The baseline environment is full liability,
where the winner always pays the auction price. In the limited liability environment the winner
can default by paying a percentage of the auction price, while with resale-based limited liability
the winner can resell the item to a losing bidder after the auction.
In theory, bidding in all limited liability treatments should be more aggressive than with
full liability, with the strongest di¤erences for lower private signals. For higher private signals,
predicted di¤erences between liability rules are less stark and, depending on the default penalty,
bidding may be equivalent to full liability.
Our experiment consists of four treatments: Full Liability, 5% Default, 25% Default, and
Resale. These treatments mimic the theoretical environment and were designed to ensure tight
control over decisions to accurately test the response of bidders to varying liability rules. In the
default treatments, the winning bidder was forced to default whenever his loss in the auction
was lower than the loss with default, by paying either a 5% or a 25% default penalty. In the
resale treatment, whenever the winner had a lower realized value than the loser, the item was
transferred to the loser at a resale price equal to his value. We introduce these controls over
decisions (which abstract from real world scenarios where default is a choice and resale involves
a less structured process) in order to cleanly test bidders reaction to the default and resale
environments, without confounds such as protable default or resale failing to occur because of
biddersmistakes.8
We nd that bidding behavior does vary across di¤erent liability environments. In support
of the theoretical predictions, bidding behavior is most aggressive in the 5% default treatment.
We also nd that bidders are able to integrate the incentives of the resale market into their
bidding decisions, which results in higher bids, but the e¤ect of resale weakens over time. So
we have partial support of the theory in the case of resale-based limited liability. In contrast to
predictions, we nd that bidding behavior under a high default penalty (25%) is similar to full
liability, so bidders only react to limited liability induced through default when the penalty is
relatively low.
These results indicate that bidders are sensitive to the type of liability environment they face
7Previous studies (Roelofs, 2002, and Onderstal and Van der Veen, 2011) nd empirical evidence that bidders
respond to strong limited liability incentives (full costless default or very low penalties) compared to a full liability
baseline.
8For example, if bidders failed to respond to the incentives of a more exible resale market it would be unclear
if they were not responding because of beliefs that the resale market would fail, or because they misunderstood
the limited liability incentives of resale.
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in an auction, but in contrast to theoretical predictions they do not always respond to limited
liability by bidding more aggressively. Roelofs (2002) and Onderstal and Van der Veen (2011)
provide previous experimental evidence of more aggressive biddersbehavior but consider full
default and a low and xed default penalty, respectively. Hence, their results are in-line with
the behavior observed under a low default penalty in our experiment.
Turning to seller revenue, while bids are observed to be highest under the 5% default rule, the
nal revenue achieved in this case was often lower due to the prevalence of default. Consequently,
revenue is highest in the resale treatment. The resale treatment also resulted in the highest
allocative e¢ ciency. From the bidders perspective, average earnings are essentially equivalent
across all environments (including full liability). Conditional on making a loss, resale or a low
default penalty (5%) were most e¤ective at mitigating losses.
Therefore, our results suggest that resale may be the preferred limited liability mechanism by
both sellers and bidders. The reason is that, in addition to allowing bidders to limit losses once
uncertainty over their valuations is realized, resale also allows to correct an ine¢ cient allocation
of the item achieved in the auction due to this uncertainty, while default does not and may even
increase ine¢ ciency by delaying the nal allocation to the bidder with the highest value.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After a brief discussion of the related literature,
in the next section we present the theoretical predictions. Section 3 describes the design of the
experiment. Section 4 discusses the experiment results and the last section concludes.
Related Literature. This paper contributes to the literature on limited liability in auctions.
A number of theoretical papers have established that changing the liability of a bidder changes
the underlying incentives of the auction which a¤ects bidding behavior and ultimately, auction
outcomes. For example, Waehrer (1995) demonstrates that under a bid deposit, which is the
maximum payment required under default, bids become more aggressive as the deposit amount is
decreased which also leads to higher levels of default. Harstad and Rothkopf (1995) examine the
possibility of bid withdrawals, also nding more aggressive bidding under this scheme. Zheng
(2001), Pagnozzi (2007a), and Board (2007) analyze limited liability induced through wealth
constraints where capped downside losses (due to lower initial wealth) result in more aggressive
bidding behavior and ine¢ cient allocations. Similar results have also been established in the
procurement setting (e.g., Roelofs, 2002; Parlane, 2003; Burguet et al., 2012). While more
aggressive bidding should lead to higher revenues; its not necessarily the case that sellers are
better o¤ since the winning bidder may default, particularly if sellers are unable to fully recover
items (Board, 2007).
On the experimental side, to our knowledge, only two papers deal with limited liability rules
in the auction setting.9 Roelofs (2002) examines a common value procurement auction with
9Other experimental papers have addressed the possibility of default and limited liability, in a di¤erent sense.
Limited liability created by budget constraints was examined by Hasen & Lott (1991) in a comment regarding
the design of Kagel & Levin (1986). A typical constraint faced in economic experiments, and the issue raised
by Hasen & Lott, is that subjects cannot make losses. Therefore, subjects with low cash balances have limited
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full (costless) default, nding empirical evidence that bidders do choose to bid more aggressively
when default is allowed, but mixed evidence on the e¤ectiveness of the theory to predict behavior.
Onderstal and Van der Veen (2011) analyze rst and second price auctions with a xed penalty
in the event of default nding that bidders react more aggressively than theory predicts to the
presence of limited liability. Our paper di¤ers from both of these studies in three important
ways: (i) di¤erences across limited liability formats are examined (ii) resale is introduced as a
market-based form of limited liability (iii) the default penalty is changed to a percentage-based
penalty, and responses to the level of the penalty are also examined.
2. Theoretical Analysis
Model
In this section, we construct a simple model that provides the framework to experimentally
investigate the e¤ects of di¤erent liability environments on bidding strategies and auction out-
comes. We consider a (sealed-bid) second-price auction for one item, with no reserve price:
bidders simultaneously submit a bid for the item; the highest bidder is awarded the item and
pays a price equal to the second-highest bid.
There are 2 risk-neutral bidders. The nal use value for the item for the seller is 0, while
the nal use value for bidder i is
vi  xi + "i; i = 1; 2:
Prior to the auction, bidder i observes the private signal xi which is drawn from a uniform
distribution on the support [0; x]. However, the bidder does not know "i, an idiosyncratic and
uncertain component of his valuation, which is equal to 0 with probability 12 , and is equal to "
with probability 12 . All signals and use values are independent.
Therefore, the nal use value of bidder i, i = 1; 2, is
vi =
(
xi with probability 12 ;
xi + " with probability 12 ;
and
E[vi] = xi +
"
2
:
After the auction, both bidders learn both use values  i.e., v1 and v2 become common knowl-
edge.10
liability because the downside loss is capped at zero. Kagel & Levin (1991) respond to this comment with how
they controlled for limited liability by providing cash endowments to the subjects that covered the maximum
possible loss. Budget constraints can also be viewed as a form of market-based limited liability, but this type of
liability is not examined in this paper.
10The assumption that a bidder learns the use value of his opponent simplies the analysis of the resale market
but does not a¤ect our qualitative results.
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This valuation structure captures an environment where bidders are uncertain about their
exact valuations when they participate in the auction, but this uncertainty is resolved after the
auction. Therefore, the auction winner may end up paying more than his valuation for the
item on sale, and realize it after the auction terminates. In this case, the auction winner may
prefer not to keep the item and pay the auction price, if he is protected by some form of limited
liability.
We consider three di¤erent liability environments after the auction:
1. Full Liability: the winning bidder must pay the entirety of the auction price to the seller.
2. Statutory Limited Liability through Default: the winning bidder can default (after learning
his use value), return the item to the seller and only pay a fraction  2 (0; 1) of the auction
price to the seller.
3. Market-Based Limited Liability through Resale: the winning bidder cannot default but can
resell the item to the losing bidder, by making a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er.11
While many other resale mechanisms yield qualitative predictions that are similar to the
ones that we will describe, our set-up provides a clean framework to analyze the response of
bidders to the limited liability aspects of a resale opportunity, which is our primary topic of
interest. With this modelling choice, the resale market yields the highest prot to the winning
bidder, since he can make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er equal to the value of the losing bidder, thus
obtaining the whole resale surplus. Therefore, biddersresponse to resale-based limited liability
should be strongest in our environment.
We focus on symmetric equilibrium bid strategies, that are increasing in biddersprivate
signals.
Full Liability
With full liability, if bidder i wins the auction at price p, he earns an expected prot equal to
E[vi]  p; while if he loses the auction, he earns 0. Therefore, in a second-price auction bidder i
bids a price such that his expected prot from winning is equal to zero  i.e.,
bF (xi) = xi +
"
2
; i = 1; 2: (2.1)
The bidder with the highest private signal wins the auction and the allocation is ine¢ cient
whenever bidder i wins but vj > vi  i.e., with probability "4x .
12 Moreover, the auction
winner obtains negative prot whenever the bid of his competitor is higher than its use value.
11This is similar to the resale market structure analyzed by Calzolari and Pavan (2006), for example, who
assume that the proposer of the take-it-or-leave-it o¤er is chosen randomly.
12This is the probability that "i = 0 and "j = " and xj < xi < xj + ".
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Specically, bidder i obtains negative prots when
 
xj +
"
2
 2 xi; xi + "2 and "i = 0  i.e.,
with probability "4x .
13
Limited Liability through Resale
Suppose now that the winning bidder can resell. With symmetric and increasing bidding func-
tions, bidder i wins the auction if and only if xi > xj and resells to bidder j (by making an o¤er
equal to vj) if and only if
vj > vi , "j > xi   xj + "i.
Therefore, conditional on bidder i winning the auction, resale requires that: (i) "j = ", (ii)
"i = 0, and (iii) xi   xj < ".
In a second-price auction, bidder i bids a price equal to his expected prot from winning the
auction (because if he loses, he obtains zero even if he buys from the auction winner)  i.e.,
E[i ji wins ] = Pr [no resale ji wins ] E[vi ji wins and does not resell ]+
Pr [resale ji wins ] E[resale price ji wins and resells ]:
In the Appendix, we show that the equilibrium bidding function with resale is
bR(xi) =
(
7
8xi +
3
4" if xi < ";
xi +
"
2 +
"2
8xi
if xi > ":
(2.2)
Since the winning bidder has the option of reselling the item to the losing bidder who may
have a higher use value, this provides a form of limited liability in the event that the winning
bidder turns out to have a low value. The resale option can mitigate losses at the conclusion of
the auction (if the auction price is higher than the realized value of the winner) or increase the
prot of the winner bidder (when there are gains from trade in the resale market). Consequently,
in the auction, a bidder is willing to bid a price that reects the value of this option (i.e., the
expected resale price) and equilibrium bidding behavior is therefore more aggressive than with
full liability: bR(xi) > b

F (xi). Moreover, compared to the case with full liability, with resale the
sellers revenue is higher and the nal allocation is always e¢ cient.
In our experiments, we let x = 50 and " = 20, so that the equilibrium bidding function with
resale is
bR(xi) =
(
7
8xi + 15 if xi < 20;
xi +
50
xi
+ 10 if xi > 20:
Figure 2.1 plots the bidding functions bR(xi) and b

F (xi) (for x = 50 and " = 20).
13 In this case, bidder i has value is xi and wins the auction, but the auction price is xj + "2 > xi.
8
0 10 20 30 40 50
10
20
30
40
50
60
x
bid
Figure 2.1: Bidding functions with Full Liability (solid) and with Limited Liability through
Resale (dashed).
Limited Liability through Default
If a bidder defaults after winning the auction, he returns the item to the seller and pays a
penalty which is a percentage  of the auction price. Therefore, a bidder chooses to default
after winning the auction at price p if and only if his prot from keeping the item and paying
the auction price is lower than the default penalty  i.e.,
vi   p <  p , vi < (1  ) p;
and the actual prot of the auction winner is
max fvi   p;  pg :
The choice to default critically depends on . As ! 1, the prot converges to the full lia-
bility case and bidders never choose to default. As  decreases, default becomes more attractive
for the winning bidder. As  ! 0, we have the strongest form of limited liability: the winner
always defaults when vi < p and never earns negative prot. In the Appendix, we show that a
bidder defaults if and only if "i = 0 and
xi < x
  (1  ) "
2
:
9
The equilibrium bidding function with default is
bD(xi; ) =
(
xi+"
1+ if xi < x
;
xi +
"
2 if xi  x:
(2.3)
When a bidders private signal is su¢ ciently high, the bidder never chooses to default and bids
as with full liability. By contrast, when a bidders private signal is low, he bids a percentage of
his highest possible value and more aggressively than with full liability. The reason is that the
bidder knows he can cut down his losses in case the realization of the idiosyncratic component
is low: he has the option of giving up an item with low value and only pay a fraction of the
auction price. Therefore, bD(xi; )  bF (xi).
Notice that the degree of a bidders aggressiveness with default is inversely related to the
penalty : the higher the penalty, the lower the equilibrium bid. Moreover, the threshold x is
decreasing in : the higher the penalty, the easier it is that the bidder does not choose to default,
so that the bidder bids more aggressively due to limited liability for lower values only.
Of course, if the winner defaults and returns the item to the seller, then the allocation is
ine¢ cient. Assuming that x  1, this happens whenever bidder i wins the auction but "i = 0
 i.e., with probability 14 . Hence, the probability of a nal ine¢ cient allocation is higher than
with full liability if and only if x > ".
With the parameters used in our experiment, the bidding function with default is
bD(xi; ) =
(
1
1+(xi + 20) if xi <
10(1 )
 ;
xi + 10 if xi  10(1 ) :
In the experiment, we implement two default treatments: one with a high penalty  = 0:25;
and one with a low penalty  = 0:05. When  = 0:05, bidders always bid more aggressively than
with full liability (since x = 190, which is higher than the maximum private signal). When
 = 0:25, x = 30 and the equilibrium bid function is kinked: bidders with high private signals
bid as with full liability and bidders with low private signals bid more aggressively than with
full liability (but less than with  = 0:05).
Figure 2.2 plots the bidding functions bD(xi; 0:25), b

D(xi; 0:05), and b

R(xi) for comparison.
Notice that bD(xi; 0:05) > b

R(xi), while b

D(xi; 0:25) > b

R(xi) if and only if xi is su¢ ciently
low.14
Theoretical Predictions
Summing up, the theoretical predictions for our experiments are as follows:
Result 1. Bids and auction prices are higher with a low default penalty than with resale, and
are higher with resale than with full liability  i.e., bD(xi; 0:05) > b

R(xi) > b

F (xi).
14 In fact, 4
5
(xi + 20) <
7
8
xi + 15, xi > 403 .
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Figure 2.2: Bidding functions with Low Default Penalty (dotted), with High Default Penalty
(dashed) and with Limited Liability through Resale (solid grey).
Result 2. Bids and auction prices are higher with a low default penalty than with a high de-
fault penalty,and are (weakly) higher with a high default penalty than with full liability  i.e.,
bD(xi; 0:05) > b

D(xi; 0:25)  bF (xi).
Result 3. Bidders with low (high) private signals bid higher (lower) with a high default penalty
than with resale  i.e., bD(xi; 0:25) > b

R(xi) if and only if xi <
40
3 .
Result 4. The probability of a nal ine¢ cient allocation of the item on sale is 0 with resale,
and is higher with a low default penalty than with full liability.
3. Experiment Design
The experiments are designed to analyze bidding behavior and auction outcomes under four
di¤ering liability treatments. The baseline full liability treatment requires winning bidders to
keep the item and pay the full auction price, even when making losses. The three remaining
treatments introduce forms of limited liability that vary between a high default penalty where
bidders are liable for 25% of the auction price if they default, a low default penalty where
bidders only pay 5% of the auction price under default, and a resale treatment where trading
automatically takes place in a post-auction resale market if the auction winner does not have
the highest value.
In all treatments, each round began with a second-price (clock) auction with 2 bidders
bidding for a hypothetical item of uncertain value.15 Each bidder observed a signal of the value,
15The use of a clock auction is based on previous experimental evidence that a clock improves subject under-
standing of bidding strategies (e.g., Bernard, 2006).
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xi, independently drawn from a uniform distribution on [0,50]. The nal use value of a bidder
was determined through an independent 50/50 lottery over two possible use values: xi or xi+20.
During the auction, bidders knew the distribution of signals, their own draw, and distribution
of nal use values.
Bidders participated in the auction through a computer interface showing a bid clock in-
creasing from 0 in increments of 1. The clock represented the current price and subjects chose
to drop out at a price that they were not willing to pay. In contrast to a more typical im-
plementation of an ascending auction, subjects were not made aware of the dropout price of
their opponent and the auction only ended when both bidders dropped out. The winner was
the subject who dropped out last, and the auction price was equal to the rst dropout bid.16
If neither subject dropped out, the auction automatically ended at a price of 70, the maximum
possible nal use value. Ties were broken randomly by the computer software.
At the conclusion of the auction, the nal use values were randomly drawn by the computer
software. A bidder who won the item earned the di¤erence between his nal value and the
auction price. In the default penalty treatments, if the winning bidder was making losses he
would automatically default if the penalty payment under default, which was a percentage of the
auction price, was less than the loss from not defaulting. In the resale treatment, (regardless of
whether he was making losses) a winning bidder who did not have the highest value automatically
traded the item at a resale price equal to the highest realized value. The winning bidder would
then earn the di¤erence between the resale price and the auction price. While alternative, non-
automated, bargaining mechanisms for resale could have been used (e.g., free-form bargaining),
our design allowed us to keep experimental control over the resale market.17
The treatments are summarized below:
 Full Liability (F): The winner is fully liable for all losses in the event that earnings are
negative.
 Resale (R): If the losing bidder has a higher realized nal value than the winner, the
winner automatically resells to the losing bidder at a price equal to the losing bidders
value.
 5% Default (D5%): If by paying the auction price the winner would make a loss higher
than the default penalty, he automatically defaults and pays 5% of the auction price.
 25% Default (D25%): If by paying the auction price the winner would make a loss
higher than the default penalty, he automatically defaults and pays 25% of the auction
16This dynamic implementation of the second-price auction has the major advantage of allowing us to observe
the bids of both subjects in an auction, rather than just the losing bid.
17For example, it is known that in less structured resale procedures subjects often split the resale surplus
more favorably than predicted in a take-it-or-leave framework, and resale sometimes fails to occur because of
disagreement (Pagnozzi and Saral, 2017). Under these less controlled resale mechanisms, if subjects bid less
aggressively it is unclear whether they choose to do so because they do not understand the limited liability
aspects of resale or because they believe they cannot obtain any resale surplus.
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Sessions (Independent Subsessions) Subjects
F / R 2 (4) 32
F / D5% 2 (4) 32
F / D25% 2 (4) 32
Session Structure
Rounds 1-5 F
Rounds 6-10 R, D5%, or D25%
Rounds 11-20 F
Rounds 21-30 R, D5%, or D25%
Table 3.1: Experimental sessions and round structure
price.
Subjects were students at Florida State University recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
At the start of the experiment, they ran through the Holt and Laury (HL) (2002) risk preferences
procedure, and one of the choices was randomly chosen for payment. Prior to the beginning of
each treatment, subjects were given instructions that included an example of bidding behavior,
and the opportunity to participate in one unpaid practice period against a computerized robot
bidder. All subjects participated in 30 paid auction rounds. In the rst ten rounds subjects
participated in the full liability baseline (5 periods) followed by one of the limited liability
treatments (5 periods). The last rounds were 10 periods of the full liability baseline, followed
by 10 periods of a limited liability treatment. Table 3.1 summarizes the treatment and session
structure.
We ran a total of 6 sessions, with 16 participants per session divided into 2 groups for
random rematching of partners in each period, leading to two independent groups (subsessions)
per session. In the results section, the analysis is performed with clustering at the subsession level
since this is the rst level of independence. The same value draws were used in all treatments.
The experiment was programmed using Z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjectsearnings
were denominated in experimental currency units (ECUs), exchanged into dollars at a rate of
$0.04 per ECU. Subjects were given an endowment of 150 ECUs, from which losses and prots
were tallied. The earnings from the HL procedure were not included in this endowment. Average
earnings of the subjects were $28.16, including the show-up fee of $10 and HL earnings.
4. Results
We now describe the main experimental results. Section 4.1 presents summary statistics. The
remaining sections provide formal regression analysis and statistical tests of the observed regu-
larities: Section 4.2 considers bidding behavior, while Section 4.3 discusses revenue, e¢ ciency,
and earnings.
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4.1. Summary Statistics
We begin with summary statistics that provide a broad picture of the main treatment e¤ects. In
our analysis, we di¤erentiate between results based on data from all periods and results based
on data restricted to the last 20 periods (last 20).
Bid Auction Final
xi  30 xi > 30 Price Revenue
F 34:6
(34:9)
25:6
(24:5)
47:6
(50:0)
25:1
(26:5)
25:1
(26:5)
D25% 34:2
(36:4)
25:1
(27:4)
47:8
(50:0)
25:1
(29:2)
23:2
(27:5)
R 38:1
(37:0)
29:6
(27:5)
50:7
(51:3)
29:1
(29:0)
29:1
(29:0)
D5% 38:6
(42:4)
29:2
(32:6)
52:7
(57:2)
28:8
(34:8)
20:5
(22:8)
last 20 F 35:6
(34:0)
26:5
(24:1)
50:2
(49:7)
26:0
(25:8)
26:0
(25:8)
D25% 34:1
(35:5)
24:6
(26:9)
50:0
(49:8)
24:7
(28:6)
23:0
(26:7)
R 37:5
(36:0)
28:9
(26:9)
51:7
(51:1)
28:3
(28:1)
28:3
(28:1)
D5% 38:9
(41:4)
29:6
(32:0)
54:5
(56:9)
29:0
(33:5)
19:1
(22:0)
Table 4.1: Average observed bids, prices, and revenue. Theoretical predictions in parentheses.
Table 4.1 summarizes observed average bids, auction prices, and nal seller revenue across
treatments. We include in parentheses the predicted averages based on the signal draws used
in the experiment. The results are presented from the lowest to the highest predicted bid (F to
D5%). Observed average bids in the R and D5% treatments are higher than the full liability
baseline, in line with the theoretical predictions. In the D25% treatment, bids are roughly
equivalent to those with full liability, even when separating low (xi  30) and high signals
(xi > 30). So observed behavior with a high default penalty is not more aggressive than with
full liability (as was predicted for low signals).
Comparing the observed results to the point predictions, for low signals, bids are relatively
close to the prediction under full liability, higher than predicted under resale, and lower than
predicted in both default treatments. So resale results in the highest average bids for lower
signals, which is in contrast to the prediction of highest average bids under D5%. For high
signals, observed averages are always lower than predicted, with the least deviation in the resale
case. More generally, the comparison demonstrates more similarity between the F and D25%
treatments for all private signals, rather than D25% and R as predicted. Restricting the data
to the last 20 periods, average bids for higher signals increase, indicating some learning in the
direction of the theory. This e¤ect is not observed for lower signals except in the full liability
treatment.
Auction prices equal the rst drop out bid in a group and are highest in the resale and
5% default treatments, mirroring the results for average bids. In contrast to the theoretical
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predictions, average auction prices are slightly higher in the resale treatment than in the 5%
default treatment. Restricting the data to the last 20 periods reverses this ranking, but the
di¤erences between the two treatments remain small.
The nal revenue earned by the seller in the auction takes into account default and it is equal
to the percentage of the auction price paid by the winner in case of default, and to the auction
price otherwise (i.e., in the resale, full liability, and default treatments with no default). The
theoretical predictions are based on the realized nal draws from the experiment. As expected,
default lowers revenue compared to the auction price, especially in the D5% treatment. The
resale treatment results in the highest revenue, while revenue in the two default treatments is
lower than in the full liability baseline.
Earnings Losses % Losses % Default % Resale
Auction Final Auction Final
F 17:0
(17:2)
 8:4
( 5:5)
18:5
(16:8)
   
D25% 14:9
(12:8)
15:5
(13:3)
 8:3
( 7:9)
 5:4
( 5:0)
20:4
(18:8)
8:8
(10:0)
 
R 11:9
(13:7)
15:3
(15:4)
 11:4
( 6:7)
 0:4
(0:8)
22:5
(19:2)
  29:6
(17:9)
D5% 12:2
(7:1)
14:4
(10:1)
 10:5
( 10:3)
 1:9
( 1:9)
25:0
(35:8)
22:9
(33:3)
 
last 20 F 14:9
(16:6)
 8:7
( 5:3)
22:7
(17:7)
   
D25% 14:6
(11:8)
15:0
(12:5)
 7:3
( 8:3)
 5:5
( 5:0)
20:6
(20:0)
7:5
(11:9)
 
R 11:6
(13:1)
14:6
(14:9)
 11:4
( 7:0)
 2:1
(0:4)
22:5
(20:0)
  29:4
(18:1)
D5% 11:8
(7:7)
14:6
(10:8)
 12:4
( 10:8)
 2:0
( 1:8)
26:9
(35:0)
25:6
(32:5)
 
Table 4.2: Average observed earnings, and frequency of losses, default, and resale. Theoretical
predictions in parentheses.
Table 4.2 summarizes bidders earnings at the auction stage and nal earnings which are
adjusted for default and resale (columns 1 and 2). We also report auction and nal average
losses (i.e., earnings conditional on a bidder paying more than his value in the auction). The
last three columns provide relative frequencies of auctions ending with bidder losses, default, and
resale (by the winner to the highest-value bidder). We include comparisons to the theoretical
predictions, based on the realized nal draws from the experiment (rather than expectation), to
evaluate the relative performance of theoretical behavior given the realized values.18
Higher auction prices in the R and D5% treatments resulted in lower auction earnings for
bidders, but resale and default helped raise nal earnings by limiting losses. With full liability,
bidders obtain higher average nal earnings; but when the data is restricted to the last 20
periods, bidders are similarly well-o¤ in all treatments, with average earnings around 15. After
18Although the equilibrium bidding strategy does not lead to losses in expectation, a bidder may still su¤er
losses for particular value realizations.
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the auction, bidder losses were reduced by all limited liability rules, with the strongest e¤ect in
the R and D5% treatments.
Losses at the auction stage and default were most common in the low penalty (D5%) treat-
ment, which is expected since bidding is most aggressive in this treatment. The full liability (F)
treatment results in the lowest frequency of losses, as predicted. Restricting the data to the last
20 periods, however, shows that bidders were least likely to make losses in the D25% treatment.
Resale markets opened in approximately 29% of auctions, which is 11 percentage points higher
than the theoretical prediction. The resale market was not only used to mitigate losses; out of
the 71 resale events, in 32 cases (45%) the winning bidder was not making losses in the auction.
Auction E¢ ciency Final Random
pre-lottery post-lottery E¢ ciency E¢ ciency
F :94
(1)
:92
(:96)
:92
(:96)
:75
D25% :92
(1)
:91
(:96)
:87
(:88)
:74
R :93
(1)
:92
(:95)
1
(1)
:75
D5% :94
(1)
:92
(:94)
:74
(:67)
:75
last 20 F :95
(1)
:92
(:95)
:92
(:95)
:75
D25% :93
(1)
:92
(:95)
:88
(:86)
:73
R :94
(1)
:93
(:95)
1
(1)
:74
D5% :94
(1)
:93
(:94)
:72
(:67)
:75
Table 4.3: Average observed e¢ ciency. Theoretical predictions in parentheses.
Table 4.3 summarizes auction e¢ ciency and how (nal) e¢ ciency changes after the resolution
of value uncertainty, as well as after resale and default when relevant. Theoretical predictions
are based on signal draws for pre-lottery e¢ ciency and realized nal values for post-lottery and
nal e¢ ciency. The random e¢ ciency measures in the last two columns results from allocating
the item to each of the two bidders with equal probability.
The uncertainty in nal value creates two forms of auction e¢ ciency. The pre-lottery e¢ -
ciency is dened as the ratio between the signal of the auction winner and the highest signal
of a bidders. In theory, this should be 1 in all treatments because bid functions are symmetric
and increasing in private signals. The observed pre-lottery auction e¢ ciency, while lower than
1, is relatively high, with no notable di¤erence across treatments. The post-lottery auction ef-
ciency, calculated after the resolution of value uncertainty, is dened as the ratio between the
value of the winner and the highest realized value. In all treatments, this is slightly lower than
pre-lottery e¢ ciency.
Because of default or resale, nal allocative e¢ ciency may di¤er from auction e¢ ciency.
Notice that resale generates a nal e¢ ciency of 1 as the item is transferred to the bidder with
the highest realized value, while default generates a nal e¢ ciency of 0 since the item is returned
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to the seller. Final e¢ ciency is lower in the D5% and D25% treatments, as bidders often exercised
the default option, especially with a low penalty option.
Random e¢ ciency is dened as the average of the two bidderssignals divided by the max-
imum signal. The auction always outperforms a random allocation in terms of e¢ ciency. The
limited liability environment, however, can negatively impact e¢ ciency. In fact, nal e¢ ciency
with a low default penalty (D5%) is lower than with a random allocation, because of the very
high default rates.
4.2. Bidding Behavior
Figure 4.1 provides a scatterplot of observed bids and private signal draws.19 The experiment
implemented a between subjects design for the limited liability treatments and a within subjects
design for the comparison of bidding behavior to the full liability baseline, so the graphs separate
the full liability data by the limited liability treatment in which a subject participated. Each
graph also includes the upper and lower bounds of the nal use value (xi and xi+20), regression
lines (dashed) for observed bids, and theoretical bid functions (solid).
Following the average bid patterns observed in table 4.1, bids appear higher with limited
liability through resale (R) or with a low default penalty (D5%) than under full liability (F).
Contrasting the regression line with the theoretical prediction, it is evident that observed bids are
less aggressive than predicted in both default treatments. In the R and F treatments, regression
lines are above prediction for lower signals; while observed bids are at or below the prediction
for higher signals.
Although bids should lie between the signal and the upper bound of the nal use value in all
treatments, we do observe bids outside of these bounds.20 Bids above the upper bound appear
most frequently in the R and D5% treatments, while bids below the lower bound appear more
frequently in the F and D25% treatments.21 In the analysis that follows, we report results based
on all observations. In the appendix, we also present results excluding bids outside the bounds.
For a general view of treatment di¤erences in bidding, we conduct power analysis on sub-
session averages for bids. The strongest analysis lies in the comparison of the F treatments
to the limited liability treatments, due to the within subjects design. Comparing F versus R
(using only the subset of F(R) means), subsession averages of 35.2 for F(R) and 38.1 for R are
signicantly di¤erent (p = 0:01), with an estimated power of 98%.22 Subsession averages of 35.5
for F(D5%) and 38.6 for D5% are also signicantly di¤erent (p = 0:03), and the power of this
19To improve readability, we only plot bids placed in rounds 3, 8, 13, 16, 23, and 26.
20 In the resale treatment, bidding above the upper bound might be due to speculation (bidding aggressively
to win the item and resell). However, this cannot explain overbidding in the default and full liability treatments.
The observed overbidding is similar to behavior in sealed-bid second price auctions with known valuations (Kagel
et al., 1987; Cooper and Hang, 2008). This form of overbidding is di¤erent from the one observed in rst price
auction because of risk aversion (Cox et al., 1988).
21Bidders choosing to bid below the lower bound of the lottery was also observed by Katok and Salmon (2009)
in a similar experimental design under full liability rules.
22The estimated mean e¤ect under R for a test with 80% power and  = 0:05 is 37.12.
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Figure 4.1: Scatterplot of observed bids and signal xi. The upper (xi + 20) and lower bounds
(xi) for use values are in light gray. Dashed black lines are regression lines for the observed data,
and solid black lines represent the theoretical bid functions.
test is 78%.23 In the comparison of F(D25%) and D25%, the subsession averages of 32.9 and
34.2 are not signicantly di¤erent (p = 0:27). The estimated e¤ect size in the D25% treatment
for a power level of 80%,  = 0:05, and given the mean bid of 32.9 in the F(D25%) treatment is
36.9, which is above what we observe.
Examining subsession average bids across limited liability treatments, there is a notable
di¤erence between the R and D25% treatments with subsession averages of 38.1 and 34.2, which
are signicantly di¤erent from each other (p = 0:06). However the power of this test is only 50%
given the between subjects nature of the data.24 Similarly, we observe di¤erences between the
D5% and D25% treatments (averages of 38.6 and 34.2, p = 0:10), but the power is 37% due to
a higher di¤erence in standard deviations.25
23The estimated mean e¤ect under D5% for a test with 80% power and  = 0:05 is 38.7.
24To reach a power level of 80%, given  = 0:05, we would need 14 independent observations (the current data
has 8).
25Despite having a similar di¤erence in means to the R/D25% comparison, the di¤erence in standard deviations
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To test the relationship between theoretical and actual bids, we analyze regressions with the
observed bid as the dependent variable and the predicted theoretical bid as the independent
variable for each treatment (see table A.1 in the appendix). When observed bids match the
theoretical predictions, the coe¢ cient on the theoretical bid should equal to 1. In the F and
R treatments, post-estimation tests did not reject the hypothesis that the coe¢ cient on the
theoretical bid is 1 (p  0:13), demonstrating adherence to the theory. In the D5% treatment,
this coe¢ cient is .91 and signicantly di¤erent from 1 (p = 0:02), indicating that bidding with
a low default penalty is less aggressive than predicted. In the D25% treatment, we also nd
evidence that observed bids are lower than predicted with a coe¢ cient of .94, however the p-value
resulting from the coe¢ cient test for di¤erence from 1 is only marginally signicant (p = 0:09).26
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
all last 20 xi < 30 xi < 30 & last 20 xi > 30 xi > 30 & last 20
xi 0.886*** 0.934*** 0.942*** 0.972*** 0.689*** 0.760***
(0.0215) (0.0217) (0.0306) (0.0274) (0.0427) (0.0720)
R 3.153*** 1.330 3.178*** 1.137* 3.182*** 1.699
(0.393) (0.769) (0.479) (0.592) (0.949) (1.086)
D5% 3.342*** 3.202*** 3.854*** 3.828*** 2.598*** 2.238***
(0.420) (0.341) (0.608) (0.378) (0.450) (0.686)
D25% 1.582** 0.655 1.007 0.176 2.475* 1.521
(0.701) (0.958) (0.691) (0.845) (1.146) (1.158)
Constant 12.51*** 13.21*** 11.92*** 12.76*** 20.05*** 20.04***
(0.574) (0.614) (0.544) (0.436) (1.708) (2.892)
Observations 2,880 1,920 1,719 1,191 1,161 729
R-squared 0.692 0.766 0.494 0.551 0.189 0.301
Clusters 12 12 12 12 12 12
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.4: Fixed e¤ects regressions with bid as the dependent variable. Standard errors clustered
at the subsession level.
To examine the treatment e¤ects on bidding behavior, table 4.4 presents xed e¤ects regres-
sion results with bid as the dependent variable. Models 1 and 2 examine basic treatment e¤ects,
while models 3-6 account for di¤erences based on low and high signal draws. Models 1, 3, and
5 use data from all periods, while models 2, 4, 6 restrict the data to the last 20 periods. In
all specications, the full liability treatment is the baseline and all models include the private
signal draw xi and treatment dummies.
The positive signicant coe¢ cients on all treatment dummies in model 1 indicate that bids
are signicantly higher in all limited liability treatments than in the full liability baseline, pro-
between D5%/D25% was higher. Hence, to reach a power level of 80%, given  = 0:05, we would need 20
independent observations (the current data has 8).
26Omitting observations where bidders bid below their signal or above the upper bound for nal value, we
obtain similar qualitative results except for the R treatment, where a test that the coe¢ cient on theory bid is
equal to 1 is rejected (coe¢ cient 0.97, p = 0:05), so observed bids are lower than predicted.
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viding support for the theoretical predictions. Post-estimation tests between the limited liabil-
ity coe¢ cients also demonstrate signicant di¤erences between the D25% and both the D5%
(p = 0:05) and R treatments (p = 0:07), supporting theoretical results 1 and 3. No signicant
di¤erences are found between the R and D5% treatments (p = 0:74), in contrast to the prediction
of theoretical result 4.
In models 3 and 5, the signicant e¤ect of the D25% treatment is mitigated, only reaching
marginal signicance for high signals. Coe¢ cient tests between liability treatments in model 3
(low signals) demonstrate results similar to model 1: signicant di¤erences between the D25%
and both the R and D5% treatments (p = 0:02 and p = 0:01, respectively), and no signicant
di¤erences between the R and D5% treatments (p = 0:39). In model 5, di¤erences between the
limited liability conditions are reduced as coe¢ cient tests demonstrate no signicant di¤erence
between treatments (p  0:58), although bidding is still higher than with full liability.
In model 2, 4, and 6, the positive signicant coe¢ cient on the D5% treatment across all
specications restricted to the last 20 periods indicate that bids are signicantly higher than
in the full liability baseline, while no signicant di¤erences are found for the R and D25%
treatments. Notice, however, that this is not necessarily due to a reduction in aggressive bidding
in these treatments, because the higher constant in models 2 and 4 indicates higher average bids
than in the full liability treatment. This mirrors what was observed in the average bids summary
in table 4.1. Consequently, the increase in bids in the baseline F makes it less likely to observe
di¤erences, unless bids are also increasing in the limited liability treatments.
Coe¢ cient tests between the limited liability treatments in model 2 demonstrate signicant
di¤erences between the D5% and both R and D25% treatments (p = 0:04 and p = 0:02, respec-
tively), while no signicant di¤erence emerges between the R and D25% treatments (p = 0:59).
Results are similar for coe¢ cient tests in model 4.27 In model 6, coe¢ cient tests show no signif-
icance di¤erence between the limited liability treatments (p  0:60), conrming that for higher
signals treatment di¤erences are minimal in later periods.28
Empirical Result 1: Bidding with limited liability is more aggressive than with full liability (F),
especially in the low default penalty (D5%) and resale (R) treatments. This di¤erence decreases
over time, except in the low default penalty (D5%) treatment.
27Coe¢ cient tests between the D5% and R or D5% and D25% report p < 0:01, while the test between R and
D25% reports p = 0:37.
28We report the same set of regressions with observations where bidders bid below their signal or above the
upper bound for nal value omitted in table A.2 in the appendix. Similar to the regressions testing the theoretical
bid, the discussed results qualitatively hold, with a notable di¤erence in the R treatment. In this case, bidding
more aggressively than the F treatment is then only marginally signicant. Of course, with resale, speculation
is a possible strategy, so bidding above bounds can be explained by this and so the restricted results are not as
informative since overbidding is not necessarily due to mistakes in bidding.
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4.3. Outcomes
In this section, we formally analyze outcomes including auction prices, sellersrevenue, e¢ ciency,
and buyersearnings.
Table 4.5 presents pooled OLS regressions on auction price, nal revenue, and nal e¢ ciency.
The rst two models have the auction price as the dependent variable; model 1 includes data
from all periods and model 2 is the restricted to the last 20 periods. The variables X(1) and
X(2) represent the highest and second highest signal draws in each auction group, respectively.
We also include variables for the risk prole of the participants in an auction group: max Safe
is the highest number of safe choices and min Safe is the minimum number of safe choices made
by a participant in the Holt and Laury (2002) risk preferences procedure.29
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Auction Price Final Revenue Final E¢ ciency
last 20 last 20 last 20
X(1) 0.129*** 0.106*** 0.186*** 0.170*** 0.00590*** 0.00611***
(0.0194) (0.0202) (0.0235) (0.0269) (0.000915) (0.000795)
X(2) 0.766*** 0.888*** 0.655*** 0.716*** -0.00469*** -0.00628***
(0.0189) (0.0286) (0.0380) (0.0645) (0.000997) (0.00138)
R 4.623*** 3.365*** 4.532*** 3.112*** 0.0751*** 0.0741***
(0.612) (0.872) (0.556) (0.797) (0.00732) (0.00764)
D5% 3.748*** 3.564*** -4.508*** -6.466*** -0.177*** -0.195***
(0.741) (0.828) (0.891) (1.632) (0.0213) (0.0325)
D25% 0.206 -1.134 -1.654** -2.711* -0.0491** -0.0293
(0.705) (0.912) (0.685) (1.298) (0.0209) (0.0187)
max Safe -0.461* -0.707** -0.524* -0.610** -0.00571 -0.00331
(0.243) (0.264) (0.261) (0.232) (0.00453) (0.00483)
min Safe 0.272 0.581 0.138 0.232 -0.00298 -0.0101
(0.466) (0.614) (0.337) (0.490) (0.00640) (0.00920)
Constant 9.852*** 10.44*** 10.76*** 12.02*** 0.851*** 0.885***
(2.707) (2.972) (2.350) (2.761) (0.0521) (0.0482)
Observations 1,440 960 1,440 960 1,440 960
R-squared 0.546 0.624 0.457 0.492 0.167 0.190
Clusters 12 12 12 12 12 12
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.5: Pooled OLS regressions with either auction price, nal revenue, or nal e¢ ciency as
the dependent variable. Standard errors clustered at the subsession level.
By theoretical results 1-4, the auction price should be highest in the D5% treatment and
lowest in the F treatment (and also in the D25% treatment for higher signals). The results in
table 4.5 partially support the theory. The signicant coe¢ cients on the R and D5% treatment
dummies and joint coe¢ cient tests between the R and D5% treatments (p > 0:212) provide
29We obtain similar qualitative results for treatment e¤ects if we exclude these behavioral measures.
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evidence that auction prices are highest in the D5% treatment, but also that they are equivalently
high in the R treatment (in contrast to predictions). The second highest signal impacts the
auction price more than the highest signal, which is expected in a second price auction where
the highest losing bid sets the price.
Empirical Result 2: Auction prices are highest in the low default penalty (D5%) and resale
(R) treatments, and lowest in the high default penalty (D25%) and full liability (F) treatments.
Models 3 and 4 examine nal revenue of the auction seller, which can di¤er from the auction
price only in the default treatments. More aggressive bidding and lack of default in the resale
treatment leads to the highest nal revenue. While auction prices are high also in the D5%
treatment, the frequency of default signicantly lowers revenue compared to the full liability
treatment. Default also signicantly lowers revenue in the D25% default treatment, but the
magnitude of this e¤ect is smaller and, in later periods, is only signicantly di¤erent from full
liability at marginal levels. The data also provides a behavioral e¤ect of risk aversion: the
negative and signicant coe¢ cient on max Safe shows that groups with more risk averse bidders
have lower prices, and this e¤ect is strengthened over time.
Models 5 and 6 examine nal e¢ ciency, which takes into account default and resale. Final
e¢ ciency is 0 with default (since the buyer returns the item to the seller), is 1 with resale
(since the item is transferred to the bidder with the highest nal value), and is equivalent to
auction e¢ ciency otherwise. The positive signicant coe¢ cient on the resale treatment (R)
dummy and negative signicant coe¢ cient on the low default penalty (D5%) dummy indicate
that nal e¢ ciency is higher with resale and lower with a low default penalty than in the full
liability baseline, as expected. Behavioral di¤erences in bidding also impacted e¢ ciency because
increases in the second highest signal of a group reduces e¢ ciency: the higher the signal of the
bidder who should lose, the more likely the auction allocation is to be ine¢ cient.30
Empirical Result 3: Final revenue and e¢ ciency are highest in the resale treatment (R) and
lowest in the low default penalty treatment (D5%). Final revenue and e¢ ciency are lower in
the high default penalty treatment (D25%) than in the full liability treatment (F), but this e¤ect
decreases over time.
Table 4.6 examines bidderswelfare and provides xed e¤ects regressions on biddersnal
earnings, taking into account both resale and default. Models 1 and 2 have unconditional nal
earnings as the dependent variable, while models 3 and 4 only consider observations where
bidders were making a loss at the conclusion of the auction (in order to analyze which limited
liability treatment is most e¤ective in mitigating losses).
30Table A.3 in the appendix reports the same set of regressions with restricted data that omit groups with at
least one bidder who bid less than his signal or more than his highest nal value. The results are qualitatively
similar, but signicance levels are reduced. Of course, this must be interpreted cautiously since the restriction
eliminates a large number of group observations due to the strict rule of deleting any group where at least one
bidder bid outside of bounds (regardless of whether the other bidder bid within bounds).
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Final Earnings Final Losses
last 20 last 20
xi 0.528*** 0.508*** -0.0523 -0.0371
(0.0445) (0.0367) (0.0476) (0.0224)
R -0.440 0.280 8.280** 5.141
(0.894) (0.950) (2.713) (3.370)
D5% -1.189 0.0294 7.363*** 7.501***
(1.052) (1.636) (0.747) (0.992)
D25% -2.639** 0.433 3.168 4.309*
(1.114) (1.713) (1.795) (2.107)
Constant 0.170 -0.746 -7.361*** -7.843***
(1.264) (0.762) (0.927) (0.675)
Observations 1,440 960 296 221
R-squared 0.166 0.142 0.232 0.246
Clusters 12 12 12 12
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.6: Fixed e¤ects regressions with bidder nal earnings as the dependent variable. Stan-
dard errors clustered at the subsession level.
In model 1, the negative coe¢ cients on the D25% treatment dummy indicates that bidders
earned signicantly less under the 25% default penalty than full liability (F). For the R and D5%
treatments, earnings are not signicantly di¤erent from the full liability baseline. Coe¢ cient
tests indicate that earnings are not statistically di¤erent between any of the limited liability
treatments (p  0:15). In model 2 (the last 20 periods), biddersearnings in the R, D5%, or
D25% treatments are not signicantly di¤erent from full liability and coe¢ cient tests between
limited liability treatments also indicate no di¤erences (p  0:85). Models 3 and 4 provide
evidence that the R and D5% treatments reduce nal losses, while the D25% treatment does
not signicantly improve losses over full liability. Shifting to the last 20 periods (in model 4),
the D5% treatment is the only treatment that robustly mitigates losses.31
Empirical Result 4: Biddersearnings are statistically equivalent across all treatments. Bid-
derslosses are lowest in the resale (R) and low default penalty (D5%) treatments, but this e¤ect
decreases over time for the resale (R) treatment.
5. Conclusion
We study how di¤erent liability conditions a¤ect bidder strategies in auctions with uncertain
values, and consequently revenue, e¢ ciency, and bidderswelfare. Evidence from an incentivized
31The same set of regressions where the data is omitted when a bidder bid below his signal or above the highest
nal value yield the same qualitative results (see table A.4 in the appendix). No di¤erences are found in bidders
earnings between treatments.
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environment shows that bidders do respond to changes in liability rules, but the level of the
response depends on the form and level of liability. Bidders are most aggressive when statutory
liability requirements (i.e. default payments) are low, but they also respond aggressively to
external market-based limited liability induced by the presence of a resale market. In contrast
to predictions, bids under a high default penalty are not more aggressive than with full liability
and are signicantly lower than in the other limited liability environments.
Although a low default payment yields the most aggressive bidding, default limits the revenue
collected by the seller to a fraction of the auction price. The highest revenue is achieved in
the resale treatment, where more aggressive bidding leads to higher prices without default.
Moreover, resale outperformed the other environments in terms of e¢ ciency since it provides an
opportunity to correct an ine¢ cient auction allocation. From the bidders perspective, resale
and the low default penalty are most e¤ective in mitigating losses.
While we provide a rst empirical look into biddersresponse across liability requirements,
there are a number of key di¤erences between the environments tested and the eld that should
be taken into account when interpreting our results. First, we assumed an automated default
choice and did not consider future penalties in reputation or monetary payments. In the eld,
bidders may be unwilling to exercise a default option for reputation reasons, so our results
are more informative for auctions where repeated interaction is unlikely. Second, the resale
market was also automated and took place immediately after the auction if gains from trade
existed. While resale does not bear the same stigma as default, market frictions like incomplete
information may limit the e¢ ciency and the probability of resale in the eld, which would lower
the limited liability incentives provided by resale.
In sum, the level of liability (high or low) and type of limited liability (statutory or through
resale) are both critical factors inuencing the behavioral response of bidders. Our results
suggest that both sellers and bidders may prefer to have post-auction resale as a mechanism
to limit losses of bidders who are uncertain about their values, while simultaneously increasing
revenue. In all cases, liability requirements must be carefully considered when designing auction
markets, as they will a¤ect the revenue and e¢ ciency achieved.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Equilibrium Bidding Functions.
Consider rst Limited Liability through Resale. In this case,
Pr [resale ji wins ] = Pr ["j = "] Pr ["i = 0] Pr [xi   xj < " jxi > xj ]
= min

"
4xi
;
1
4

:
Moreover, E [xj ji wins ] = xi2 and the expected resale price conditional on bidder i winning and
reselling is
E[resale price ji wins and resells ] = E[vj jxi > xj and vj > vi ]
= max

xi
2
+ "; xi +
"
2

:
Finally, notice that
E["i jxi > xj , xi < " and vi > vj ] = E["i j"i  "j ]
= 0 1
3
+ " 2
3
;
and
E["i jxi > xj , xi > " and vi > vj ] = Pr [xj < xi   "]
Pr [vi < vj jxi > xj and xi > " ]E["i]+
Pr [xi   " < xj < xi and vi > vj ]
Pr [vi < vj jxi > xj and xi > " ] E["i j"i  "j ]
=
4xi   4"
4xi   "
"
2
+
"
4xi   "2" =
2xi"
4xi   ":
Therefore, when xi < 20,
E[i ji wins ] = Pr [no resale ji wins ] E[vi ji wins and does not resell ]+
Pr [resale ji wins ] E[resale price ji wins and resells ]
=
3
4


xi +
2
3
"

+
1
4

xi
2
+ "

=
7
8
xi +
3
4
":
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By contrast, when xi > 20,
E[i ji wins ] =

1  "
4xi



xi +
2xi"
4xi   "

+
"
4xi


xi +
"
2

= xi +
"
2
+
"2
8xi
:
This yields the equilibrium bidding function (2.2).
Consider now Limited Liability through Default. Notice that a bidder never bids more than
xi + ", his highest possible use value. When "i = ", the winning bidder never defaults (since a
bidder never pays an auction price higher than xi + " and hence his prot from not defaulting
is strictly positive when "i = "). When "i = 0, the winning bidder defaults if
xi   p <  p , p > xi
1  :
Suppose that bidder i defaults if "i = 0. Since losing the auction yields a prot of 0, in a
second-price auction the bidder bids a price p such that his expected payo¤ from winning the
auction is equal to zero  i.e.,
Pr ["i = "] (xi + "  p) + Pr ["i = 0] ( p) = 0
, xi + "  (1 + ) p

2
= 0 , p = xi + "
1 + 
:
Of course, bidder i never defaults if his prot from not defaulting is greater than the default
penalty, when he wins the auction at price p and "i = 0  i.e., when
xi   xi + "
1 + 
>  xi + "
1 + 
, xi > x  (1  ) "
2
:
(In other words, p < xi1  if xi > x
, so that bidder i has no incentive to bid a price that makes
default attractive.) In this case, bidder i bids xi + "2 , the price at which his expected prot is
equal to zero when he always pay the auction price.
Therefore, the equilibrium bidding function with default is (2.3).
A.2. Additional Regressions
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
F R D5% D25%
Theory bid, bi 0.972*** 1.010*** 0.914*** 0.947***
(0.0169) (0.0194) (0.0183) (0.0212)
Observations 1,440 480 480 480
Clusters 12 4 4 4
R-squared 0.917 0.935 0.933 0.923
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.1: Pooled OLS regressions with the observed bid as the dependent variable using data
from all treatments. Standard errors clustered at the subsession level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
all last 20 xi < 30 xi < 30 & last 20 xi > 30 xi > 30 & last 20
xi 0.987*** 0.988*** 0.968*** 0.975*** 0.929*** 0.908***
(0.0127) (0.0128) (0.0207) (0.0164) (0.0218) (0.0347)
R 0.740* 0.307 0.880* -0.0294 0.375 0.664
(0.376) (0.437) (0.475) (0.483) (0.298) (0.536)
D5% 2.269** 2.436** 2.492** 2.384* 2.175*** 2.676***
(0.846) (0.803) (0.973) (1.100) (0.662) (0.727)
D25% 0.172 0.351 0.394 0.0655 -0.529 0.696
(0.447) (0.653) (0.576) (0.856) (0.675) (0.476)
Constant 10.14*** 10.43*** 10.32*** 10.68*** 12.65*** 13.52***
(0.312) (0.302) (0.351) (0.329) (0.818) (1.398)
Observations 2,165 1,488 1,340 938 825 550
R-squared 0.909 0.923 0.757 0.791 0.631 0.666
Clusters 12 12 12 12 12 12
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.2: Fixed e¤ects regressions with bid as the dependent variable and the data restricted
to bids within the signal and upper bound of the nal use value. Standard errors clustered at
the subsession level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Auction Price Final Revenue Final E¢ ciency
last 20 last 20 last 20
X(1) 0.0596*** 0.0448*** 0.117*** 0.0891*** 0.00606*** 0.00547***
(0.0107) (0.0140) (0.0229) (0.0207) (0.000820) (0.000695)
X(2) 0.897*** 0.923*** 0.776*** 0.776*** -0.00536*** -0.00621***
(0.0230) (0.0336) (0.0515) (0.0664) (0.00118) (0.00143)
R 1.873*** 1.769* 1.889*** 1.674* 0.0598*** 0.0613***
(0.546) (0.896) (0.507) (0.770) (0.00832) (0.00996)
D5% 1.466 1.197 -5.493*** -6.312*** -0.162*** -0.147***
(0.926) (1.500) (0.488) (1.433) (0.0167) (0.0255)
D25% -1.324 -1.337 -2.411*** -2.438* -0.0255 -0.0220
(0.794) (0.963) (0.770) (1.172) (0.0186) (0.0181)
max Safe -0.362* -0.383 -0.419** -0.377 -0.0111* -0.0118
(0.176) (0.257) (0.180) (0.272) (0.00571) (0.00765)
min Safe -0.158 0.0302 0.0344 0.141 0.00856 0.00551
(0.244) (0.364) (0.235) (0.379) (0.00536) (0.00785)
Constant 12.01*** 11.64*** 11.52*** 11.90*** 0.855*** 0.900***
(1.577) (1.911) (1.350) (1.691) (0.0523) (0.0512)
Observations 813 577 813 577 813 577
R-squared 0.780 0.778 0.621 0.604 0.184 0.174
Clusters 12 12 12 12 12 12
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.3: Pooled OLS regressions with either auction price, nal revenue, or nal e¢ ciency
as the dependent variable. The data is restricted to and the data restricted to groups where
neither bidder bid below signal or above the upper bound of the nal use value Standard errors
clustered at the subsession level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Final Earnings Final Losses
last 20 last 20
xi 0.508*** 0.464*** 0.00723 0.00124
(0.0415) (0.0457) (0.0368) (0.0370)
R -0.981 -0.108 6.061** 1.167
(1.457) (1.213) (2.375) (1.372)
D5% -2.363* -0.797 5.556*** 5.883***
(1.265) (2.405) (0.809) (0.943)
D25% -0.974 0.106 0.777 2.138*
(1.191) (1.862) (0.551) (1.136)
Constant 1.410 1.958* -6.830*** -6.885***
(1.108) (1.150) (0.693) (0.778)
Observations 1,024 679 170 123
R-squared 0.162 0.132 0.217 0.206
Clusters 12 12 12 12
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.4: Fixed e¤ects regressions with bidder nal earnings as the dependent variable and
the data restricted to bids within the signal and upper bound of the nal use value. Standard
errors clustered at the subsession level.
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